Decommissioning of petroleum installations—major policy issues by Osmundsen, Petter & Tveterås, Ragnar
Osmundsen, P and Tveterås, R. (2003) Decommissioning of petroleum 
installations—major policy issues. Energy Policy, 31(15), pp. 1579-1588
Link to official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0301-4215(02)00224-0 (Access to 
content may be restricted)
UiS Brage
http://brage.bibsys.no/uis/
This version is made available in accordance with publisher policies. It is the 
authors’ last version of the article after peer review, usually referred to as postprint.
Please cite only the published version using the reference above.
Decommissioning of petroleum installations—major policy issues
Petter Osmundsen, Ragnar Tveterås
Abstract
Following the Brent Spar controversy, the OSPAR countries reached a unanimous agreement in 1998 for the future rules for disposal of 
petroleum installations. The vast majority of existing offshore installations will be re-used or returned to shore for recycling or disposal. 
For installations where there is no generic solution, one should take a case-by-case approach. We provide a survey of international 
economic and regulatory issues pertaining to disposal of petroleum installations, and provide speciﬁc examples by analysing the 
Norwegian decommissioning policy. Implications of disposal decisions for the ﬁshing industry, a central stakeholder, are analysed. 
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1. Introduction
Disposal of obsolete offshore petroleum installations is a relatively new issue involving tens of billions of dollars
globally.1 Powerful players—multinational oil companies, environmental organisations and governments—all have 
high stakes here. A maj or point of dispute is the magnitude of social costs in terms of externalities to other users of
the marine environment. The issue of petroleum installation decommissioning also raises important questions about,
ﬁrst, the public’s willingness to pay for removal, and, second, the reputation effects for oil companies associated with
different disposal decisions.
deep Northern Atlantic was the so-called ‘Best Practicable Environmental Option’ (BPEO). It was concluded that 
deep-water disposal would have negligible impact on the marine environment, which was conﬁrmed by independent
scientists. The UK Government approved this original plan in February 1995.
1 Disposal is deﬁned as the process and/or agreement which brings an installation to its ﬁnal location(s), where it is re-used, re-cycled or deposited 
(Anon., 1999, p. 215). Decommissioning is deﬁned as the activities related to bringing a platform from an operating condition to a cold, 
hydrocarbon free condition (but does not include activities related to removal or other methods of disposal).
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Shell UK requested the international certiﬁcation, classiﬁcation and advisory body Det Norske Veritas (DNV), to perform a comparative assessment of 
the proposed options for disposal of Brent Spar (DNV Report No. 970911-0007). The scope of work covered technical feasibility, safety assessment,
environmental assessment and price veriﬁcation.
Brent Spar is the most recent case that has highlighted the public’s concern about the disposal of oil installa-tions
and the potential importance of reputation effects. The Brent Spar was taken out of operation in 1991 after some 15
years of service in the Brent Field in the northern North Sea. A very large ﬂoating oil storage and loading buoy the
Spar, had stored oil from the Brent ‘A’ platform and acted as a tanker loading facility for the whole of the
Brent Field. Studies by several independent companies established that deepwater disposal of the Spar at a site in the 
During the summer of 1995, a public protest arose in many countries against the planned deepwater disposal of the
Spar installation—strongly supported by environmental organisations. Reputational considerations lead Shell to
abandon deepwater disposal, and instead dismantle the installation on land. The new decision was approved by the UK
government. Disposal costs increased from an estimated 38.5 million USD for a deepwater disposal to a ﬁnal total of
71.4 million for the onshore dismantling, according to Shell (Lode, 1999). This gives an indication of Shell’s valuation of
the reputation effects.
In the process of developing a decommissioning plan, the oil companies use independent consultants
and contractors to carry out environmental assessments, safety studies and cost analyses.2 These are
predominantly technical reports, undertaken by engineers, and they are generally not available to the public.
In spite of the interesting policy issues and the large sums involved, decommissioning of petroleum
installations seems to have been given scant attention by researchers of economics. We give an overview of the
most important economic topics related to decommissioning and disposal, illustrated by recent Norwegian
case material.
2. International decommissioning issues
There are more than 6500 offshore installations worldwide, with an estimated overall removal cost of 20 billion
USD. There is a great variety of installations, each designed for a particular set of conditions: ranging from ﬁxed
shallow-water structures in 30 m of water to tension leg platforms in 900 m of water. Some 490 installations
(excluding subsea facilities) are located in the North Sea and the North East Atlantic. The majority of platforms, 
around two-thirds, standing in less than 75 m of water or weighing less than 4000 tonnes, are referred to as small
structures, although they can still be the size of the Houses of Parliament. The remaining platforms, mainly in
Norway and the UK, comprise 112 large steel structures—which may be as high as the Eiffel Tower and have a
footprint the size of a football ﬁeld—and 28 concrete gravity base structures. In addition, there are some 26
ﬂoating installations. Over the next 10–20 years, an average of 15–25 installations are expected to be abandoned
annually in Europe. This represents, amongst other materials, 150,000–200,000 tonnes of steel per year. The
continental shelf bordering the states of the European Community and Norway counts some 600 offshore oil and
gas platforms, 400 subsea structures and 600 subsea wellheads.
A typical platform consists of the topsides, which contain the drilling, processing, utilities and accommodation
facilities, and the supporting substructure or jacket. Steel j ackets can weigh up to 40,000 tonnes and are ﬁxed to the
seabed by steel piles. The topsides themselves can weigh up to 40,000 tonnes. Concrete gravity base structures are
even larger, for example, Troll on the Norwegian continental shelf weighs some 700,000 tonnes, and sits on the
seabed, stabilised by their own weight and penetration of the skirt into the seabed. In the absence of storing
facilities, only the topsides of the platform are in contact with hydrocarbons and may contain limited amounts of
potentially hazardous substances, whereas the substructure or jacket is generally clean steel or concrete.
Cost–beneﬁt calculations are in this context needed for two types of decisions: (a) the choice of method of
removal and disposal of installations, and (b) timing issues. As for (a), after the production is closed down,
topsides are in most cases taken to shore for recycling. Interesting policy issues, therefore, mostly pertain to the various 
solutions for the substructure. The basic decommissioning options are as follows:
(i) Leave in place.
(ii) Partial removal, with alternatives:
(a) emplacement/toppling on site, (b) carry to shore for recycling or disposal as waste, 
(c) deepwater disposal, (d) artiﬁcial reefs, and (e) re-use/other uses.
(iii) Total removal, with alternatives: (a) carry to shore for recycling or disposal as waste,
(b) deepwater disposal, (c) artiﬁcial reefs, and  (d) re-use/other uses.
Artiﬁcial reefs mean using cleaned offshore platforms to create reefs for marine life. Early evidence indicates that
such reefs enhance and protect existing marine habitats and create new habitats for marine animals and plants.3
Artiﬁcial reefs have been developed in the US, Brunei, Japan, Cuba, Mexico, Australia, Malaysia and the
Philippines.
The choice of decommissioning procedure is subject to stringent and extensive international regulations. Still,
considerable discretion is left to national governments. In 1958, the Geneva Conference adopted a Convention on
the continental shelf, requiring that an offshore installation being abandoned must be entirely removed. The 1982
UN Conference of the Law of the Sea introduced some exceptions, allowing some installations to be left in place as
long as requirements linked to navigational safety, ﬁsheries and environmental impact were met. The 1989 UN
International Maritime Organisation (IMO) Guidelines for the Removal of Offshore Installations required that
abandoned structures standing in less than 75 m of water and weighing less than 4000 tonnes in air, excluding the
topsides, must be entirely removed.4 Platforms exceeding those limits need to be cut off to allow 55 m of clearance 
between their highest point and the surface. The water depth limit will increase to 100 m for new platforms
installed after 1 January 1998. Disposal at sea of offshore installations in the North Sea or North East Atlantic is
regulated by the Oslo and Paris Conventions. These two conventions were merged into one (OSPAR) in 1997.
Following the Brent Spar controversy, the OSPAR countries reached a unanimous agreement in 1998 for the
future rules for disposal of petroleum installations.5 
3See section four for a further discussion and references.
4 In addition, there are national regulations, which reﬂect the circumstances of the different countries. Since the UK and Norway are the only 
countries to have installations in waters deeper than 75 m, only these two countries have developed detailed procedures and guidelines for 
offshore disposal. Abandonment plans have to be approved by government and the necessary licences obtained.
5 OSPAR Decision 98/3 on the Disposal of Disused OffshoreInstallations.
The vast majority of existing offshore installations will be re-used or returned to shore for recycling or disposal. 
Exceptions are made for certain installations or parts of installations in the event that an overall j udgement in
each case gives good reasons for sea disposal. For those installations where there is no generic solution, one
should take a case-by-case approach, and considerable discretion rests with local governments.
Local discretion is considerable for timing issues. The problem of determining the optimal removal date can be
considered as a cost minimisation problem (Amundsen, 1997). In determining optimal removal date, the oil
companies have to trade off a number of factors. The costs of keeping the platform at sea after closing down of
production are maintenance costs. From the perspective of the government, there are also external effects to
consider, i.e., effects on ﬁsheries and the environment. The beneﬁts of deferral of decommissioning, however, may
be considerable. These beneﬁts take the form of real options gained by postponing the removal of installations:
(1) there may be potential gains in the form of improved technology of removal, since this is a new industry that is
at the very start of its learning curve, and (2) the installations may once again be used for extraction purposes in
the event of recovery of new petroleum reservoirs in the vicinity of the platform or in the event that new
technology makes it possible to use existing facilities in producing from more remote reservoirs.
Two issues that are not analysed thoroughly in this paper, but nevertheless deserve to be mentioned, since they
seem to have some inﬂuence on both international legislation and disposal decisions, are the population’s
willingness to pay for a clean environment, a public good, and reputation effects stemming from decisions on
disposal options.
Although few individuals may physically experience obsolete offshore oil installations, one should consider the
possibility that the public may be willing to pay for their removal, even in the absence of environmental
externalities in the form of pollution, etc. A signiﬁcant proportion of the public probably desire that the oceans
are kept close to their ‘‘natural’’ state. For example, many individuals do not like the thought of oceans devoid of
mammals ﬁrst-hand. Analogously, individuals may not like the idea of the ocean being used as a ‘‘graveyard’’ for
large oil installations, however far these may be from the coast or sea travel lanes. Hence, as the public may be
willing to pay for the existence of blue whales, it may also have a positive willingness to pay for the recycling of
redundant offshore installations.
The negative existence value of offshore oil installations may be one of the elements inﬂuencing the reputation
costs associated with decommissioning. Reputation is often viewed as a strategic resource for the
individual holder, as a positive reputation may provide the holder with goodwill capital. If a
country’s—or company’s—decommissioning policies lead to a reduction in goodwill, other countries’ public
opinion, special interest groups and governments may become less tolerant of its actions in other areas,
and may even introduce direct reprisal actions in the form of public protests, boycotts or court actions. The
Brent Spar and Exxon Valdez incidents are two cases where the oil companies involved seem to have
perceived the reputation costs to be considerable and have been willing to incur extra costs to reduce these
(SNF, 1998, Chapter 4).
3. Norwegian decommissioning policies
We now discuss decommissioning with reference to Norwegian case material. Publicly available government
reports containing details on decommissioning in speciﬁc ﬁelds, make Norway a good research choice in terms of
available data. The fact that Norway—having many of the largest extraction facilities in the world—represents a
large fraction of global disposal costs, makes it an interesting country in its own right. There are also several
reasons why the Norwegian case is of general relevance. In Norway there is a wide range of offshore petroleum
ﬁelds that differ considerably with respect to water depths and design of extraction facilities. Thus, it offers
diversity regarding technical complexity and costs associated with removal. Further-more, the fact that
Norwegian authorities have a record of high environmental standards may imply that Norwegian case material
may give indications as to future global developments in the decommissioning arena.
The Norwegian Parliament sanctioned the OSPAR Convention. However, there is a number of large 
installations on the Norwegian continental shelf for which decommissioning is not regulated directly by 
the Convention. Concrete installations and steel jackets with weight above 10,000 tonnes are exempted 
from the OSPAR ban on sea disposal. For concrete installations, the Norwegian government has full 
discretion, i.e., they may be fully or partly removed, left in place, toppled on site for use as artiﬁcial reef, 
or dumped elsewhere. The Norwegian government also has partial discretion with respect to 
decommissioning of the six largest permanent steel installations on the Norwegian continental shelf,   
6See proposition from the Norwegian government, St. prp. no. 8, 1998–99.
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 Two installations on the Ekoﬁsk Field, two on the Oseberg ﬁeld, and one on the Brage and Heimdal ﬁelds.
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permanent steel installations on the Norwegian continental shelf i.e., the jacket may be left on the seabed but 
not dumped elsewhere.8 After 9 February 1999, however, all new steel installations must be designed so that the 
total removal is feasible.
Characteristic features of the Norwegian continental shelf are great depths and large reservoirs, developed
by large installations. Thus, the cost of decommissioning in the Norwegian sector is on an average
considerably greater than in the rest of the world. There are approximately 6500 offshore oil and gas
installations in the world, with an estimated overall removal cost of 20 billion USD. Decommissioning all of
the Norwegian installations was in 1993 estimated to cost 7.5 billion USD, i.e., as much as 37.5 per cent of the
estimated global costs.9 Such estimates are highly uncertain, though. There is not much experience in this 
ﬁeld; the ﬁrst Norwegian decommissioning plan was issued in 1994. New technology and the development of
a decommissioning industry are likely to bring down removal costs. Thus, an estimate from 1995 was 5.4
billion USD for a total removal of all installations, and 1.8 billion for a partial removal.10 The total 
investments on the Norwegian continental shelf at that time, in comparison, were 100 billion USD.
Nevertheless, adding the fact that the Norwegian government will carry most of the costs, and that the major
part of these costs will come in a period when petroleum revenues are declining and the number of retirees is
increasing, decommission-ing will be a considerable ﬁscal burden for Norway. By establishing a considerable
petroleum fund, however, the Norwegian authorities should have the means to smooth out this effect.
The procedures for decommissioning decisions are as follows. The license owners, represented by the
operator, develop a detailed decommissioning plan. The plan is to examine and evaluate different
decommissioning options. It has a conclusion, which can be perceived as an application for the licensees
preferred decommissioning option. Thereafter, the plan is submitted to the government and at the same
time .circulated to a number of environmental and ﬁsheries organisations for comments. The plan is then
reviewed by the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, which considers environmental, technical, economic and
resource aspects. Furthermore, the ministry considers international obligations and the consequences for
ﬁsheries and shipping, and the comments of environmental and ﬁsheries organisations. Typically, the
recommendation from the Ministry to Stortinget (the Norwegian parliament), lies somewhere between
the recommendations from the licensees and the environmental and ﬁsheries organisations. The latter 
typically advocate a complete removal of all installations, whereas the former would often prefer some of the
facilities to remain on the ﬁeld or to be dumped. The Ministry would recommend only special facilities, such
as pipelines, to remain ashore. In these recommendations to Stortinget, it is emphasised that each ﬁeld is
unique and that the recommendations are not intended to form a precedent. Existing Norwegian offshore
petroleum installations are very heterogeneous with respect to factors inﬂuencing decommissioning, such as
external effects and removal costs, calling for a separate evaluation of each case.
3.1. Two decommissioning cases: the Odin field and the Ekofisk field
In this section, we examine two decommissioning cases which can be said to represent two extremes with
respect to the technical complexity and costs associated with removal of offshore oil installations, the Odin
ﬁeld and the Ekoﬁsk ﬁeld.
A maj or part of offshore installation removal costs are mobilising and demobilising costs for
specialised vessels. These costs can be reduced if decommissioning can be combined with other tasks
performed by the specialised vessels on the continental shelf. In addition, there are day rates to be paid
for the vessels. If there is a long transport distance related to deepwater disposal, the savings compared
to land disposal are not large.
In Norway, it is politically not perceived as an option to leave steel installations with the topside intact,
or to topple it on site.11 Furthermore, dumping of installations in international waters is not viewed as 
politically acceptable.
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Provided that there are 55 m of clear water over the remains to ensure safety of navigation.
9See report to the Norwegian government, NOU, 1993:25.
10 See proposition from the Norwegian government, St. prp. no. 36, 1994–95.
See proposition from the Norwegian government, St. prp. no. 8, 1998–99.
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Once the expensive operation of lifting the topside off the j acket has been undertaken, it is optimal—also
in economic terms—to take it on shore for re-circulation. The experience from decommissioning of the Odin
ﬁeld on the Norwegian continental shelf is that it is cheaper to take the topside on shore than to dump it.
Part of the explanation is that by deepwater disposal the transportation costs would be similar to those of
taking the installation ashore, and also it is much more costly to clean the facilities at sea. In addition, there
is the question of future liability for dumped installations.
12 See proposition from the Norwegian government, St. prp. no. 50, 1995–96.
For the Odin ﬁeld, the decommissioning study headed by Exxon, evaluated three different decommissioning 
options for the topside and the modules, as shown in Table 1.12
The licensees recommended alternative (a). This recommendation was supported by the
Ministry as being the best solution in both economic and environmental terms. Similar calculations were made 
for the substructure, as shown in Table 2.
Table 1
Decommissioning options for topside and modules
Alternative Estimated cost
(Mill USD)
15.5
18.5
(a) Remove and take ashore for recycling
(b) Remove and dispose on deepwater
(c) Placed on seabed as artiﬁcial reef 20.4
Table 2
Decommissioning options for substructure
Alternative Estimated cost
(Mill USD)
12.9
21.5
(a) Remove and take ashore for recycling
(b) Remove and dispose on deepwater
(c) Placed on seabed as artiﬁcial reef 8.4
The licensees recommended alternative (c), in situ toppling of the j acket, as a pilot proj ect for artiﬁcial
reefs. A condition from the oil companies for choosing this solution was that the ownership and the liability
of the remaining installation were transferred to the Norwegian government, without any compensation to
the Norwegian state. As for environmental impact, recycling of steel (compared to production of new steel)
would reduce emissions of CO2 equivalents and NO2 by 21,000 and 35 tonnes, respectively. The Ministry
recommended alternative (a); the savings of 4.5 million USD were not considered enough to compensate for
environmental effects and transferral of liability. It was not ruled out, however, that alternative (c) could be
relevant for other ﬁelds.
The costs of removing and recycling the pipelines on the Odin ﬁeld were estimated to be 8.7 billion USD.
The licensees recommended the pipelines to be left on the seabed, after being properly cleaned. Having been
used for the transport of gas, the pipeline would be free of heavy petroleum remainings. The Ministry
postponed the decommissioning decision about the pipelines, pending environmental evaluations and
evaluations and negotiations about where liability should be placed for installations that are left
permanently on the seabed.
The Ministry’s decommissioning recommendations for the Odin ﬁeld were similar to those for Nordst
Frigg.13 The operator, Elf petroleum, recommended dumping the monitoring station of 6000 tonnes, but 
was instructed to take it on shore for recycling. Pipelines remained on the seabed as possible
negative environmental effects could not justify the considerable removal costs (11 million USD).
13See the proposition from the Norwegian government, St. prp. no. 36, 1994–95.
The Ekoﬁsk ﬁeld represents a decommissioning case of a far greater scale than the Odin ﬁeld. Phillips
Petroleum, the operator of the Ekoﬁsk ﬁeld on the Norwegian continental shelf, has recently presented a
two-stage decommission plan, with a total cost of 1.1 billion USD.14 The Ekoﬁsk ﬁeld is located in the 
Norwegian sector of the central North Sea. There is a total of 34 installations, including ﬂare stacks, at the
Ekoﬁsk and associated ﬁelds. Of these, 25 are main structures, amounting to 3.5 million m3 of jacket 
volume. Approximately 25 local pipelines connect the installations in the Ekoﬁsk area. These pipelines
have a diameter varying from 200 to 750 mm. The majority of the pipelines are trenched, except for the
free ends of 30–100 m near the platforms. Each installation has a safety zone with a radius of 500 m.
At the ﬁrst stage of the Ekoﬁsk decommission plan, the topsides of 15 installations with a total weight
of 107,000 tonnes will be removed and taken on shore for recycling or re-use. This operation will begin in
2003 and the estimated costs are 0.7 billion USD. At the second stage, to be commenced in 2015, the
substructures (steel jackets) of 14 installations with a total weight of 64,000 tonnes are to be 
removed at a total cost of 0.4 billion USD. These substructures have to be removed under
the OSPAR convention, while an exception is made for a concrete substructure weighing 1.2
million tonnes which will be left in place. Phillips expects that new removal technologies will be introduced
before 2015, thereby reducing the removal costs for the substructures.
Removal costs are of a very different order of magnitude in the case of the Odin ﬁeld and the Ekoﬁsk
ﬁeld. The experience from the Ekoﬁsk ﬁeld suggests that when removal costs are large, both government
and oil companies prefer to defer. Since there are other ﬁelds with removal costs of a similar magnitude,
one may raise the question whether we, over time, will see an accumulation of non-producing petroleum
installations for which removal is deferred, until one reaches a point when the total accrued removal costs
are too large to be carried by the society, with the effect that large parts of the installations are left
standing at the abandoned ﬁelds indeﬁnitely.
3.2. Tax treatment of decommissioning
Decommissioning raises some interesting tax ques-tions. As a background for this discussion we ﬁrst
present the general features of the Norwegian petroleum tax regime. The Norwegian petroleum tax
system is based on the Norwegian rules for ordinary corporate tax, charged at 28 per cent of the corporate 
proﬁt. Owing to resource rents, a special tax of 50 per cent has been added to this industry, implying a 
marginal corporate income tax of 78 per cent.15 Licences are allocated by a discretionary licensing system, with 
no up-front payments by the companies. Statoil, a 100 per cent state-owned company, operates on the 
Norwegian continental shelf on a commercial basis. Through the State’s Direct Financial Interest (SDFI), the 
Norwegian government is a passive stake-holder in many licences.16 In addition, the Norwegian state owns 40 
per cent of Norsk Hydro, a central actor on the Norwegian continental shelf.
14See Anon (1999) and Stavanger Aftenblad, October 22, 1999.
As for tax treatment of decommissioning expenses, should (a) the oil companies be allowed appropriations in 
the tax accounts for future removal costs, or (b) should the actual removal costs be tax deductible?Neither is 
the case in the Norwegian Petroleum Tax Code. Instead, the state’s share of the removal costs is paid directly 
to the oil companies at the time of removal. These levies are individually sanctioned by the Norwegian 
Parliament. The main rule for the state’s share, estimated in each separate case, is the average effective 
corporate income tax rate the company has faced on the net incomes from the ﬁeld. This system for tax 
treatment, which represents an equal tax treatment approach of all ﬁelds, is thus a cost-sharing rule that is 
mimicking the tax effect of scheme (a). If the oil company has been in a tax paying position in the entire 
period of operation, the state’s share is approximately 78 per cent.  For the decommissioning of 15 platforms at 
the Ekoﬁsk ﬁeld, starting in 2003, the state is to pay about two-thirds of the removal costs.17  There are, 
however, exceptions to this cost sharing rule. In cases where the estimated state share is unreasonably low, the 
state’s share can be increased, after application by the operator. For the Nordst–Frigg ﬁeld the state’s share 
was increased from 39.7 to 50 per cent after application. Exxon applied for increasing the state’s share to
68 per cent, up from 38.2 per cent according to scheme (a), and was granted 50 per cent.18
15 Although Norwegian petroleum taxation is mainly a proﬁts tax, royalty is payable on oil production from ﬁelds approved for
development before 1986, and recently a carbon tax has been imposed on petroleum that is burnt and on gas that is directly 
released. It has been decided, however, that the royalties will be phased out over a three-year period. Also, the CO2-tax is 
likely to be reduced.
16 For more details on the Norwegian petroleum tax system, see MPE (1998).
17 Stavanger Aftenblad, October 22, 1999.
18
See proposition from the Norwegian government, St. prp. no. 50, 1995–96.
Although. the tax treatment of decommissioning costs does not convey advantageous tax credits, it 
does seem to provide the oil companies with a higher probability of obtaining a tax deduction than is
the case for other costs.
According to a proposition bill from the Norwegian government (Ot. prp. no. 33, 1985–86), there are
several reasons why removal costs are given a special tax treatment. One obj ective is to avoid
discrimination. With a traditional tax treatment, (b), a number of ﬁrms would not have had a full tax
deduction, since at the time of removal they may not have had sufﬁcient income generated in Norway to
cover the costs. It is thus not fair to say that the tax provisions are designed to reduce the government’s
exposure to abandonment costs. However, they do have the effect of postponing the state’s share of the
disposal costs, and the sharing rule provides the government with incentives to internalise disposal costs.
Still, the particular disposal cases reveal more of environmental concern than cost conscience on part of
the government, reﬂecting the priorities of the political parties. It is too soon to judge on these issues,
though, since some large disposal candidates have been postponed.
Another important obj ective of tax treatment of disposal costs is to avoid distortions in the
companies’ decisions, in particular distortions that reduce the recovery rate. Traditional tax treatment of
removal costs might tempt the ﬁrms to close down production early, while they have sufﬁcient revenue,
and refrain from building out adjacent reservoirs (satellite ﬁelds).
A reason why the oil companies were not allowed appropriations in the tax accounts for
future removal costs, (a), was perhaps the fact that this approach might imply large tax advantages
for the oil companies: because neither the timing nor the extent or costs of future removal
could be established with a reasonable degree of certainty at the time of appropriations, these would
be arbitrary. Implicit in this argument is the belief that the companies would have an incentive
to exaggerate future removal costs, e.g., by underestimating the expected cost reductions due to
advances in technology, and thereby obtain undue tax credits.
In addition to refunding parts of the companies’ share of the removal costs, the Norwegian state
would also have to carry the costs that accrue to the state equity share in the various licences.
Assuming that the private oil companies in a given licence have been in a tax paying position for
the entire period of operation, and that the SDFI holds 30 per cent of the licence, Statoil 20 per cent,
and Norsk Hydro 15 per cent, the Norwegian state is to pay 90 per cent of the removal costs.20 If
20Note that if the companies have partly been out of a tax paying position, e.g., with an 
average tax rate of 30 per cent, the state’s share would be considerably lower.
Statoil and SDFI together held 80 per cent of the equity (which is the case for some licences), the state
would be accountable for 97 per cent of the removal costs.21
 In calculating the revised cost share, the government has taken into account the company’s future tax 
position in Norway,19 i.e., scheme (b) is applied. Thus, while the main rule is (a), rule (b) may be applied if the 
main rule is unreasonable.
4. Externalities to ﬁsheries from oil installations
In several areas around the globe, such as off the Norwegian coast, the most important externalities
from offshore petroleum installations are to the ﬁshing industry. Offshore oil activities have made
considerable ﬁshing areas inaccessible for ﬁshing vessels. Hence, the disposal choice for obsolete
installations may have signiﬁcant economic consequences to ﬁsheries. This section analyses the nature of
externalities to ﬁsheries, and provides estimates from a case study of the Ekoﬁsk ﬁeld on the Norwegian
continental shelf.
Offshore petroleum installations and pipelines occupy considerable areas in the Norwegian sector that
were previously used as ﬁshing grounds or represent potential ﬁshing grounds. Most oil installations have
a safety zone that is closed to ﬁshing vessels. Pipelines on the seabed have a reputation for damaging
demersal trawl gear (Soldal, 1997). In addition, a large number of objects have been dumped on the
seabed in conjunction with oil activities, leading to damage or loss of ﬁshing gear.
21The state’s equity share, however, has been reduced in recent licensing rounds.
For both the ﬁsheries and petroleum sector most of the production is exported. In 2000, exports of
products from the seafood sector totalled US$ 3.4 billion. This is much less than the export revenues of US$
28.8 billion from the petroleum sector. But unlike the latter sector, ﬁsheries should be able to maintain
income streams around the current levels into an indeﬁnite future. The Norwegian ﬁshing industry employed
22,900 ﬁshermen in 1997, while 16,000 were employed offshore and onshore in petroleum extraction.
However, the greater short-term magnitude of petroleum revenues may have lead to a favourable treatment
of the petroleum sector in areas where the two sectors have had conﬂicting economic interests.
There exist no estimates of the total costs to ﬁsheries due to loss of access, damages to equipment and
pollution in the Norwegian sector. The estimated losses in estimated individual sectors are of minor
signiﬁcance, both in absolute terms or when compared to total revenues from the Norwegian ﬁshing sector.
However, with a gradual shift in petroleum activities from the southern waters of the Norwegian sector to the
northern waters, where ﬁsh resources are much larger, the trend is that new petroleum installations are
located closer to the more important ﬁsheries.
Until recently, the focus has been on the effects of new production facilities on ﬁsh stocks and ﬁsheries.
However, as some oil ﬁelds now approach their terminal phase, the focus is shifting towards disposal options for 
installations. An important topic is the potential externalities associated with different disposal options. 
Although petroleum activities are generally being regarded as a source of negative externalities to the ﬁsheries 
sector, it is recognised by some that there may be beneﬁts from installations that have reached their cold phase. 
There are several issues that need to be considered in an analysis of externalities to ﬁsheries from abandoned 
installations.
* Stock pollution: Are there any toxic emissions from abandoned installations that can lead to increased
mortality and/or reduction in the market value of the ﬁsh?
* Stock enhancement effect: Does the physical presence of oil installations increase the reproductive ability
of ﬁsh stocks (ﬁshing reefs), thus leading to an increase in ﬁsh biomass and harvesting potential?
* Stock concentration effect: Will the ﬁsh stocks gravitate towards the feedstock that tends to gather around
offshore installations?
* Fishing access: To what extent does the physical presence of obsolete installations and pipelines limit the
accessibility of different types of ﬁshing vessels and different gear types?
There is no general answer to the question whether abandoned oil installations will pollute the
surrounding ﬁsh population. However, it is anticipated that for the installations in the Norwegian sector the
costs associated with cleaning up after termination of production should be relatively small. The most
visible pollution is usually pile cuttings on the seabed (Anon., 1999). The environmental impact has not
been such that it has affected the prices of ﬁsh caught in the area.
The above biological and technological factors together determine which disposal option is most
beneﬁcial to ﬁsheries. In the following, we discuss these factors in more detail, partly with reference to
studies of the Ekoﬁsk ﬁeld on which we shall focus in the subsequent case study.
It is a conventional wisdom among ﬁshermen that the areas around ship wrecks are often good ﬁshing
grounds (Valdemarsen, 1978). Several studies also suggest that offshore platforms may have beneﬁcial
effects for ﬁsheries, because they serve as artiﬁcial reefs that attract ﬁsh and also enhance the stock by
allowing for an increased recruitment of juveniles to catchable size. The behaviour of ﬁshing vessels in the
North Sea also provides strong indications of the potential economic value of having oil installations as
artiﬁcial reefs. Trawlers tend to ﬁsh in a circle as close to the safety zone of the platforms as possible. For
instance, around the Ekoﬁsk ﬁeld Scottish purse seiners are involved in an intensive haddock ﬁshery in 
periods (Soldal et al., 1999, p. 25). In the Gulf of Mexico there is competition
between commercial and leisure ﬁsheries for the ﬁshing grounds around abandoned platforms (Reggio,
1987; Gurney, 1992). Despite a large research effort in several countries, however, there is no international
consensus on whether artiﬁcial reefs have a signiﬁcant stock enhancement effect or only positive stock
concentration effects (Soldal et al., 1999, p. 80). There is probably no general answer, since reef effects
depend on the characteristics of the marine environment in the particular area, such as ﬁsh species
composition, nutrient conditions and topographical conditions.
The introduction of a reef gives three possible scenarios for the total ﬁsh biomass and its distribution at
a ﬁshing ground: (1) introduction of reefs leads only to a stock concentration around the reefs, (2) reefs
cause both stock enhancement and stock concentration, and (3) the reef causes only a stock enhancement
effect, because the increased stock of ﬁsh migrates from the reefs to the surrounding areas, leading to a
fairly even distribution of the biomass in a larger area. Hence, the question is not only what effects
artiﬁcial reefs have on the total biomass, but also what effects they have on the spatial distribution of the
biomass in the areas around the reef.22
Reefs can increase the economic rent through an increase in sustainable harvest or a reduction in cost
per unit of harvest. The economic rent of the ﬁshery can increase even if the petroleum installations only
have a stock concentration effect. This is because an increased concentration of the biomass around a reef
can lead to an increase in the harvest rate per unit of time, since the time needed to search and ﬁsh is
reduced. A necessary condition for an increase in the economic rent is that the ﬁshing industry does not
have to introduce ﬁshing technologies that are more costly per unit of harvest.
If artiﬁcial reefs have a stock enhancing effect, and the ﬁsh migrates from the reef to surrounding areas, then 
some very interesting possibilities may open up for the regulation of the ﬁshery. By creating a marine reserve 
around the reef to protect the reproduction of the ﬁsh stock, the regulator can secure a steady supply of biomass 
for harvesting in the adjacent areas.23 There will be a net beneﬁt from creating a reserve, if the migration from 
the reserve area around the reef is sufﬁcient to provide for an increase in the sustainable harvest that is larger 
than the foregone harvest in the marine reserve. Some ﬁshing technologies may be physically prevented from 
operating in the vicinity of oil installations. Evidence from other countries suggests that efﬁcient exploitation 
close to reefs requires specialised reef ﬁsheries utilising a suitable gear.
22There are two biological studies of the potential reef effects of the Ekoﬁsk ﬁeld installations. According to Cripps and Aabel 
(1998) the existing working platforms in the Ekoﬁsk area ‘‘are having a small, beneﬁcial effect on local ﬁsh populations’’ (p. 15).
23 One advantage of such a marine reserve is that it should be possible to monitor the movement of vessels around 
the reef(s) at relatively low costs, by installing a radar on one of the installations.
Tveterås and Osmundsen (1999) provide estimates of the externalities to the ﬁshing industry from obsolete 
Ekoﬁsk installations. The estimates are derived under different ﬁsh population dynamics scenarios, using 
available ﬁsh stock data in the area. Sensitivity analyses were undertaken to provide estimates of the economic 
signiﬁcance of oil installations as artiﬁcial reefs. Five scenarios were considered. In the ﬁrst scenario the 
substructures of the platforms are removed and the only beneﬁcial effect is the opening of the area to ﬁsheries. 
The other four scenarios assume that the substructures are kept in place. In the second and third scenarios 
ﬁshing vessels are allowed to ﬁsh freely close to the abandoned installations. However, in scenario two 10 per 
cent of the biomass can be harvested by demersal trawlers due to ﬁsh migration to surrounding areas, while in 
scenario three the ﬁsh stock is only available to vessels with reef ﬁshing technologies. In scenarios four and 
ﬁve, a marine reserve is created around the abandoned installations, i.e., reef ﬁshing vessels are excluded from 
the area. In the fourth scenario the ﬁsh migrates to the surrounding open areas, thus making all of the 
sustainable harvest available to demersal trawlers. The mobility of the ﬁsh is assumed to be smaller in the ﬁfth 
scenario, thus leaving only 20 per cent of the biomass to be harvested by demersal trawlers, while the 
remaining 10 per cent of the sustainable catch is lost due to mortality within the marine reserves. The marine 
reserve scenario four provides the highest rent. However, the estimated rent is small, only 3.9 million USD in 
net present value terms, less than 1 per cent of the estimated removal costs.
5. Summary and conclusions
This paper has examined major policy issues associated with decommissioning of petroleum 
installations, using the Norwegian continental shelf as a case study. Decommissioning is becoming an
increasingly important issue, as many offshore petroleum ﬁelds around the world are approaching the
time when their reservoirs are exhausted. The Brent Spar incident suggests that this is also a politically
potent issue extending across national boundaries. International conventions, most notably the OSPAR
agreement, still allow for a large degree of discretion on the part of national governments in the case of
pipelines and large installations.
By signing international agreements such as the OSPAR, governments have constrained
themselves to choosing decommissioning options with limited adverse environmental effects.  
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 in this particular area must exceed the net loss to ﬁsheries of removing the installations and the cost difference of 
removing installations, e.g., it must exceed 363.9 million USD in the case of Ekoﬁsk. It is worth noting that 
Norway has a small population (5 million) and a large number of offshore platforms. In the area surrounding the 
Ekoﬁsk ﬁeld, there is a low ﬁsh density and a small share of the ﬁsh biomass is high value species. Thus, other areas 
on the Norwegian shelf have a considerably larger potential for increase in ﬁsh biomass and economic rent 
through an artiﬁcial reef program.
The most inﬂuential Norwegian ﬁsheries organisation opposes artiﬁcial reefs. Adding the fact that 
environmental organisations strongly oppose reef programs, as well as the fact that the Norwegian government 
previously has not approved such applications, it is perhaps not surprising that the Ekoﬁsk ﬁeld operator, Phillips 
Petroleum, proposes to take the steel substructures on the Ekoﬁsk ﬁeld ashore. This disposal solution is estimated 
to cost 460 million USD, compared to 100 million USD for artiﬁcial reefs. For this decommissioning decision to be 
in correspondence with society’s cost–beneﬁt calculations, the population’s willingness to pay for a clean seabed
Petroleum installations may function as artiﬁcial reefs that may provide positive ﬁsh stock concentration and 
enhancement effects, generating possible gains to specialized artiﬁcial reef ﬁsheries but losses to demersal trawlers 
that will not be able to access the area. Calculations from the Ekoﬁsk ﬁeld at the Norwegian continental shelf show 
that leaving the installations as artiﬁcial reefs and establishing a marine reserve around the abandoned installation, 
is the option that generates the highest net present value to the ﬁsheries. However, the future discounted net 
revenues for ﬁsheries are small, less than 1 per cent of the disposal costs.
In a case study of the Norwegian continental shelf we saw that removal costs are of a very different order of 
magnitude for the Odin ﬁeld and the Ekoﬁsk ﬁeld. The experience from the Ekoﬁsk ﬁeld suggests that, when 
removal costs are large, both government and oil companies prefer to defer. Since there are other ﬁelds with 
removal costs of a similar magnitude, one may see an accumulation of non-producing petroleum installations over 
time for which removal is deferred, until one reaches a point when the total accrued removal costs are too large to 
be carried by the society, with the effect that large parts of the installations are left standing at the abandoned ﬁelds 
indeﬁnitely.
Disposal of petroleum installations raises a number of interesting questions. Examples are timing issues, tax 
treatment, and liability for installations that are permanently left at the seabed. New technology and discovery of 
new reserves in adjacent areas may make it optimal once again to use the facilities for extraction purposes. Thus, it 
may be optimal to postpone the disposal of platforms.
The costs of decommissioning programs depend on the choice of strategy. However, the decommissioning strategy 
not only inﬂuences costs, but also which parties are going to carry the costs. Potential winners and losers are oil 
companies, tax-payers, and different groups of ﬁshing vessels. Hence, decommissioning is a cost–beneﬁt problem 
involving important distributional considerations, with binding political constraints represented by the national 
and international environmental opinion, as well as tax-payers’ willingness to pay for a clean seabed.
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